At the tail end of a discussion over at Catallarchy which veered into the question of Abortion, Jacqueline Passey offers this slightly contorted analogy to demonstrate why she thinks a woman who has "put another person into a situation where he can survive only with [her] assistance" doesn't have any special obligation to that person:
I drive a car. It is possible that there could be some unknown defect in the brakes on my car and they could fail, causing me to crash into someone, damaging their kidneys to the extent of which they will die without a new kidney. Coincidentally, we could be a perfect donor match. Are you saying that under these circumstances that I then should be forced to damage my body and risk my life to donate one of my kidneys?
Now, I assume that you are intended to recoil from the prospect of risking your life to save someone you have put in mortal danger, but why should this be so? Is this not a form of solipsistic cowardice? The problem with this analogy is that you are invited to identify with the person who caused the crash. But if you are trying to determine what obligations ought to apply, it is necessary to take a neutral stance. For example: look at it from the other guy's point of view. You're in your car minding your own business and get sideswiped, you're going to die if you can't get a replacement kidney. Turns out the lady behind the wheel has a spare kidney - I doubt you would be so sanguine about her refusal to save your life, especially on the grounds that it might risk her life.
It seems to me that the neutral, utilitarian calculation goes against Jacqueline's conclusion. Possible risk of death of perpetrator versus certain death of victim is not really much of a contest. It is understandable that the person who caused the crash might seek to evade responsibility for it if she could. There is no reason why everyone else is obliged to take her side as opposed to that of the victim.
This is often the principal difficulty with such analogies, they are more useful in demonstrating the rather obvious reason why a woman might want an abortion, but tend to beg the important question of why the interests of the mother ought to always override those of the foetus. A more defensible argument is to outline the circumstances in which the mother's interest is paramount - for example, prior to viability the foetus is not really any kind of "person" in its own right - and concede that at a certain stage - for example viability outside the womb - the foetus' interests deserve to get weighed at least alongside those of the mother.
The attachment of hardcore "pro-choicers" to late term abortion is hard to understand - given that most women who choose to abort late in pregnancy have already had plenty of time to make that decision, the availability of late term abortion merely assists or incentivises postponing the decision and doesn't offer any significant extra "choice" at the margin. The principal effect of a restriction on late term abortion is unlikely to be a reduction in the number of abortions, but rather an imperative to decide sooner. I suspect that this attachment is not based on any kind of principle or reasoned argument but instead on a noble lie - that something magical happens at birth which confers on the foetus the status of an individual in its own right denied it a few moments earlier - because of the fear that restriction on late term abortion in particular will lead in due course to further restrictions on abortion generally.
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