Perry de Havilland has a post over at Samizdata on Mugabe's which proposes arming those opposed to the tyrant. A comment, now mysteriously disappeared, chided Perry for this and compared his position to the defenders of the IRA. Yet if it is reasonable to arm the self-styled defenders of the victims of Mugabe's clique, then the same rationale would apply to those who styled themselves as defenders of the nationalist community in Northern Ireland from sectarian attacks. I believe it is wrong in both cases.
There is a crucial difference between intent and outcome and there is a further distinction between declared intent and actual intent. When the government says it is going to "ban" any activity, for example fox-hunting, it doesn't mean that fox-hunting will cease to take place. It just means that this activity will henceforth be punishable. If you arm a militia group with the intention of ousting Mugabe this is not the same as saying that Mugabe will be ousted by that group. It means that the group might attempt to oust Mugabe, assuming they stick to their declared intention.
There are unintended consequences which are unpredictable and there are unintended consequences which are clearly predictable. One predictable outcome of arming a militia sufficiently that it might oust Mugabe and his cronies is that such new rulers, as they would surely be, of Zimbabwe have no disincentive to behave in exactly the same way as Mugabe himself.
There are certainly problems inherent with democracy. In itself it is insufficient for liberty. It is no consolation to someone subject to the whim of a tyranny that this tyranny acts with the consent of 51% of that person's compatriots. Churchill understood this when he declared democracy to be the least worst system. Yet democracy is immeasurably superior to feudalism. Contemporary feudalism is represented by the phenomenon of the warlord. The warlord obtains and retains power not by consent of those he rules but by force.
In the course of our recent discussion about Cuba, Dick O'Brien described the contemporary appeal of Che Guevera thus
Che's idealism about overthrowing the corrupt regimes of South American robber barons
Yet, how do we know Guevara acted with the support of the people, Must we take his word for it? I cannot differentiate between Che and contemporary warlords whose "popular support" is ensured by threat of violence. What was wrong with Che Guevera's revolucion was not only that it was in the furtherance of an enforced collectivist dictatorship but that it was backed by force. It may have been a popular revolution, but how can we know? This is the revolutionary conundrum: If the people really want it, there is no need for violence to ensure its success. The only option available for those who would support revolution is the "vanguard theory". Thus a small group of radicals declare that they act in the interests of all, except that by some sort of mechanism, "all" don't realise this yet. The theory states that once the revolution has taken place "all" will see its benefits and support will be retrospectively be granted.
The vanguard theory is the justification for assorted groups, from Al-Qaeda to Marxists. It is even validated by the official version of the founding of the Irish State which accords primary importance to the 1916 rising instead of the 1919 election which elected Sinn Fein on a separatist mandate. The vanguard theory is, however, a trap which merely provides an echo chamber for one's ideology and a post-hoc justification (the omelette) to kill those who resist your vision (the eggs). It further relies, implicitly, on a vision of society divided between a lumpen, mouldable mass and an elite. This should be contradictory to Libertarianism which stresses the voluntary nature of the myriad interactions which make up society. There is no place in Libertarianism for social engineering or violent coercion for purposes other than self-defence or proxy self-defence.
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